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This, if true, is a serious problem-but why suppose that it is true? Gooch 
has an argument on this point dealing with the conditions in John Hick's 
postulated state of "eschatological verification"; he claims that "Hick's res-
urrection world works best where it is as much as possible like our present 
world in its ontology and epistemology" (p. 58).2 But while this may be true 
it isn't enough to support Gooch's position; what he needs is a general 
argument showing that no embodied state can possibly allow for an adequate 
knowledge of God. (Such an argument would presumably apply to the incar-
nate Christ and would show that he, also, had no adequate knowledge of God 
during the time of his embodiment. It is possible that Gooch would accept 
this.) General arguments of this sort are, of course, available within the 
Platonic tradition, but Gooch shows no sign of wanting to avail himself of 
such help. But lacking any such argument, his general claim about embodi-
ment and knowledge of God remains unsupported. 
In spite of these disagreements, Partial Knowledge deserves high praise, 
both as an example of a kind of book that needs to be written but usually is 
not, and because of the intrinsic merits of its content. It is highly recom-
mended for biblical scholars, for theologians, and in particular for the readers 
of Faith and Philosophy. 
NOTES 
1. On this see also Gooch' s "The Pauline Concept of the Resurrection Body," Crux 8 
(1970-71), pp. 18-29; "On Disembodied Resurrected Persons: A Study in the Logic of 
Christian Eschatology," Religious Studies 17 (1981), pp. 199-213; Bruce Reichenbach, 
"On Disembodied Resurrected Persons: A Reply," Religious Studies 18 (1982), pp. 
225-29; and Paul W. Gooch, "Reply to Professor Reichenbach," Religious Studies 18 
(1982), pp. 231-32. 
2. For the argument see, "On Disembodied Resurrected Persons," pp. 200-4. 
William Ockham, by Marilyn McCord Adams. Notre Dame, Indiana: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1987. pp. xx and 1402. $96.00. 
HESTER G. GELBER, Stanford University. 
Marilyn McCord Adams' William Ockham is a monumental work that 
became on its publication necessary reading for anyone interested in the 
thought of the Venerable Inceptor. In these two volumes Adams set herself 
the daunting task of extracting from the whole corpus of William Ockham's 
extant writings the operating principles of his thought, covering ontology, 
logic, and theory of knowledge in the first volume, natural philosophy and 
theology in the second. Of particular moment to readers will be her assump-
tion that Ockham's thought begins in his ontology, her treatment of Ockham 
and Scotus on identity and individuation, her discussions of similarity and 
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connotative terms, her review of the debate on supposition theory and her 
suggestion that it is a method of fallacy detection, her defense of Ockham 
against charges of skepticism and theologism, and her belief that there is 
some affinity between Russell's treatment of definite descriptions and 
Ockham's theory of signification. While there will be debate and controversy 
over some of her contentions, she has cast the clearest light on Ockham's 
thought to date, illuminating dark comers and corridors that others will now 
dare to explore further, pressing on where she has pioneered. 
Two kinds of scholars currently interest themselves in late medieval 
thought: intellectual historians and philosophers, and their purposes and 
methods are sufficiently different to render each at times unintelligible to the 
other. Marilyn Adams belongs decidedly among the philosophers. The 
strengths in her work come from effecting the purposes and methods of the 
philosophical side of the aisle. What weaknesses there are come largely from 
a lack of control over the purposes and methods of the historical side. 
On her view "Ockham is a philosophical theologian .... The job of a philo-
sophical theologian is to put his philosophical and his theological intuitions 
together to form a coherent whole" (2:1254). The job of the philosopher inves-
tigating a philosophical theologian is then to uncover the structure of his or her 
thought and to evaluate it for its coherence. Uncovering Ockham's philosophical 
and theological intuitions means for Adams discovering his operative definitions 
and principles. In thirty-one closely argued chapters, Adams tries to do just that. 
Because of the density of her text, it is impossible to summarize her findings in 
the compass of a review, but an analysis of a representative sample may serve 
to illuminate her method: to show how she draws definitions and axioms from 
the works of various authors who provide a background to Ockham, establishes 
variations and inconsistencies within the medieval frame of reference, and eval-
uates Ockham's position within that context. 
Adams' treatment of the distinction between God's ordered and absolute 
powers provides a manageable example. Before turning to Ockham, Adams 
distills the definitions of divine power from his two major predecessors, 
Aquinas and Scotus. Drawing from several of Aquinas' texts, Adams first 
proposes: 
and 
"(A) God can do x with respect to His absolute power, if and only if God is 
assigned the power to do x when His power is considered absolutely, in 
abstraction from His other attributes and/or from what He actually decides." 
(2:1188) 
"(B) x lies within the scope of God's ordered power if and only if God ordains 
or wills all things considered that He will do/make/produce x." (2:1188) 
Then she derives several further principles from texts of Scotus: 
248 Faith and Philosophy 
"(C) x lies within the scope of God's ordered power if and only if x accords 
with the right law that He has established." (2:1190) 
"(0) God's absolute power is His power to do anything that does not involve a 
contradiction." (2:1191) 
"(E) 'L is the established law and the lawgiver acts contrary to L' is a contradic-
tion." (2:1192) 
"(F) Necessarily, for any time t, what the lawgiver does at t conforms to the laws 
established for t." (2:1192) 
noting that Scotus' conception of ordered power differs from Aquinas' in that 
Aquinas is not concerned with thinking of God's establishing a system of 
general laws but of having a determinate plan of action enacted through His 
judgments. Scotus distinguishes between laws and judgments in that laws 
must be general and deal with all cases of a certain sort. Scotus' use of laws 
raises the possibility that the ordained order might change, first encoding one 
set of laws and then another, whereas on Aquinas' view, God's plan is im-
mutably determinate (2:1193-1194). These considerations prompt her to sug-
gest a revised version of (C): 
"(C') x lies within the scope of God's ordered power at t if and only if x 
accords with the right law that He has established for t." (2: 1195) 
These various principles raise a difficulty, however, for on Scotus' view 
everything God in fact does conforms with laws that He has established, but 
then He has to have established general laws to cover everything He does, 
whether in the order of nature or in the order of salvation. Thus 
"(G) 'God does x at t' entails 'x conforms with laws established by God for 
t.'" (2: 1195) 
It is not clear, however, on Adams' reading, that Scotus can now consistently 
hold (F) and (G) along with (C) or (C') for that would seem to preclude the 
possibility of miracles. Miracles as suspensions of natural law seem to be 
instances of divine action which fall outside of (C). If all God's actual actions 
are subsumed under (C), no miracle could occur. 
Thus, Adams concludes that Aquinas' conception of (B) as God's power 
to do what He does is not logically equivalent to Scotus' conception of (C) 
as God's power to do what is legal. She argues that for (C) to reduce to (B), 
one would need four other principles: 
"(H) God does x, if and only if x accords with the right law that He has in 
fact established," (2:1196) which presupposes: 
"(J) If God does x, then God has established a law L under which x falls," 
(2:1196) 
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"(K) IT God does x, then x is not contrary to any of the laws He has actually 
established," (2:1197) 
"(L) IT x accords with the laws that God has in fact established, God does x." 
(2:1197) 
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And all must be held as necessary truths. If any of (J)-(L) fails, that is if God 
1) does something illegal (contrary to K) or 2) something not covered by laws 
(contrary to J) or 3) fails to do something it is legal for Him to do (contrary 
to L), (H) fails. And again, miracles would seem precluded from divine action 
on the grounds of (K). Scotus, unlike Aquinas, would seem on her argument, 
to have to allow God to act at times according to His absolute power if he is 
to use the legal metaphor with consistency and yet afford a place for miracles. 
Then what of Ockham? Does he accept (B) or (C) or some third alternative? 
After establishing that Ockham accepted (D), (2: 1198) Adams elicits two 
further principles from Ockham's texts-one: 
"(M) Necessarily, if God can do x with respect to His ordered power, God 
wills to do x," (2:1200) 
which is implicit in Ockham's arguments and constitutes half of the equiva-
lence in (B). And further: 
"(N) Necessarily, if God does x, God does x with respect to His ordered 
power," (2:1202) 
which she argues yields the other half of the equivalence in (B). But Ockham 
also appeals to legal analogies to explain the distinction between God's 
ordered and absolute power, and Adams has found a number of texts in which 
Ockham apparently endorses the idea that the laws governing the redemptive 
process are not general-indicating an acceptance of (C'). Adams concludes 
that Ockham's vacillation between (B) and (C), sometimes in the space of a 
few columns or pages, presumes an equivalence between the two principles 
or the inheritance of the problem from Scotus who holds (J) and (K) while 
insisting that divine laws must be general (2:1207). 
Adams' focus here is on the texts and the interplay of axioms which she 
can abstract from them. It is the force of the argument she abstracts which 
carries her conviction of inconsistency. The value her method holds is the 
precision she brings to bear. 
As William J. Courtenay has noted in a recent article on the distinction of 
God's power during the medieval period: "The major problem was that mir-
acles and changes in God's laws were never fully integrated into the theory.'" 
What Adams' argument suggests is that Scotus' move to legalistic thinking 
made such an integration intellectually difficult if not impossible without 
some concomitant move shifting the notion of God's absolute power from 
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one of possible action to a category of actual action-a move which many 
executed in subsequent years.2 
Courtenay has suggested that the sort of difficulty Adams here displays 
might have been dealt with in tenns of a hierarchical ordering of laws: the 
divine potentia ordinata or lex aeternalis providing a general level, whereas 
the law ut nunc is the presently revealed portion of the eternal law appropriate 
to the moment and in fact in operation. In Adams' tenns (C') might be a 
subset of rather than a replacement for (C).3 Adams might respond, as indeed 
was argued in the seventeenth century,4 that the conflict between the laws of 
nature and the laws of salvation at the moment of miracle preclude any such 
hierarchical structure. 
However, the historian would note a deep anachronism in the discussion 
here which nullifies Adams' criticisms of Scotus and Ockham. She dubs the 
causally necessary connections of the physical world, "laws governing the 
natural order" (2: 1196). But the term "natural law" at the time of Aquinas, 
Scotus and Ockham was not applied to the world of nature in the seventeenth-
century sense. ~ Rather the term "law" referred primarily to the order of 
salvation. Miracles, as a part of that order, were in no sense inordinate.6 In 
Scotus' picture, God's establishment of a causal order would accord with 
right law, but that order would not in itself constitute a code of laws.' No 
moral obligation forbids beings with free will from interfering with the nat-
ural causal connections of the created order-human beings could hold up 
stones preventing them from falling, and God's miraculous actions in the 
world could similarly interpose one causal sequence for another. It was only 
at a much later date that the legal metaphor was extended to cover the 
observable regularities of the natural order according them the status of a 
coherent, independent body of law, although the origins for that application 
lie within the Scotist language.8 Definition of a miracle as a suspension or 
violation of natural law must await a later time. And it is only when the 
regularities of nature are accorded the status of a separate body of laws that 
miracles come to seem inordinate. 
Moreover, from the vantage point of the historian, Adams' very interest in 
such interrelations of abstracted principles produces a largely ahistorical product. 
While she deals with some of Ockham's key predecessors and contemporaries, 
she does so by abstracting the principles from their texts which Ockham's prin-
ciples presuppose or counteract. The matrix of abstracted definitions and axioms 
so created then floats free from context and chronology, sometimes to odd effect, 
as when she has Ockham respond to Robert Holcot, more than fifteen years his 
junior at Oxford (2: 1099), or Henry of Ghent borrow the idea of instants of nature 
from Scotus who did not begin his lectures on the Sentences until four years 
after Henry's death (2:1343). Even the most well-known change in Ockham's 
thinking, his shift from an objective-existence theory of concepts (the fictum 
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theory) to a mental-acts theory (the intellectio theory), which Adams takes 
into account throughout her work, comes loose from its chronological moor-
ings. After an evaluation, she treats these theories as two independent con-
structs equally applicable to the questions Ockham's ideas raise. Where 
inconsistencies arise, she rarely suggests they may reflect developments in 
Ockham's thinking. Nor does she raise questions about variations in 
Ockham's audience and the purposes of his different texts to resolve incon-
sistencies she finds. I do not wish with these remarks to set aside Adams' 
very considerable achievement in explicating Ockham's works and providing 
us with a much more precise view of his thought than has been available 
before. Her philosopher's capacity to get clear about Ockham's arguments 
contributes greatly to understanding his thought. But the historian would note 
that if one's interest is in the consistency of a position or a system of thought, 
the process of abstracting that position or system from a set of texts for 
evaluation is enhanced by controlling historical questions. 
The overall organization of Adams' volumes deserves some comment as 
well. Adams devotes the most discussion to Ockham's ontology and theology 
and the least to his logic and theory of knowledge, a priority that represents 
her conviction that Ockham's ontology, starting with the problem of univer-
sals, is the proper point of departure for understanding his thought. Adams 
offers no argument to justify her priorities, but it may be connected with her 
view that Ockham's theory of signification has affinities with Russell's. 
Because Ockham does not believe that people cognize substances directly, 
but only the qualities which inhere in them, what is known are the collective 
properties of things. What is directly cognized does not then provide a suf-
ficient starting point for discovering truth. To provide a foundation for truth, 
it becomes necessary to develop an argument for the things there must be, 
and such a line of reasoning leads directly to ontology. 
Adams' emphasis raises some questions, however. Ockham's theory of ab-
solute terms, terms derived immediately from intuitive cognition of present 
objects, has suggested to some an analogue with Kripke's rigid designators.9 
Ockham also espouses the view that what is individual is individuated in itself. 
If Ockham's absolute terms pick out individuals and arise in the mind through 
direct encounter with the world, talk about the foundation for truth would seem 
to require investigation of epistemology, mental language, the logic which 
encodes mental, and natural philosophy before discussion of ontology is pos-
sible.10 Because Adams provides no argument for her choice of priorities, she 
does not address these difficulties. Puzzles about Ockham's theory of absolute 
and connotative terms remain. 11 But Adams' work serves beautifully to map 
the terrain, putting old and new questions in relief for further exploration. 
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NOTES 
1. "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages," in Divine 
Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), p. 249. 
2. Idem, p. 257; Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, & Order: An Excursion in 
the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1984), pp. 67-92. 
3. Courtenay, "Omnipotence," pp. 248,251-50,254-56. Adams is more concerned 
with elucidating Ockham's texts than in engaging with the secondary literature, and her 
use of secondary material is uneven. In regard to the problems of omnipotence, neither T. 
Rudovsky's volume nor Oakley's works appear in her bibliography or notes. 
4. Oakley, Omnipotence, pp. 74-77. 
5. Oakley, Omnipotence, pp. 80-83; idem, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Sci-
ence: The Rise of the Concept of the Laws of Nature," Church History 30 (1961), pp. 433-57. 
6. See Courtenay, "Omnipotence," pp. 253-54, although Courtenay argues that Scotus' 
position opens the possibility for such a view; on Ockham, Courtenay, p. 255. 
7. The texts of Scotus important to this discussion are found in Ordinatio I, d. 44, q. 
un. nos. 3-11 in Opera Omnia ed. Charles Balic' 6 (Vatican City, 1963), 363-368. 
Particularly note no. 9 indicating that something can be ordinate in two ways, setting up 
a hierarchical order with reference to causality within the moral sphere: "Uno modo ordine 
universali,-quod pertinet ad legem communem, sicut ordinatum est secundum legem 
communem 'omnem finaliter peccatorem esse damnandum' ut si rex statuat quod omnis 
homicida moriatur). Secundo modo, ordine particulari,-secundum hoc iudicium, ad quod 
non pertinet lex in universali, quia lex est de universalibus causis; de causa autem 
particulari non est lex, sed iudicium secundum legem, eius quod est contra legem (ut quod 
iste homicida moriatur)" (p. 367). 
8. Oakley, "Laws of Nature," pp. 433-457. 
9. For example, see Calvin G. Normore, "The Logic of Time and Modality in the Later 
Middle Ages," Ph.D. dissertation (Toronto, 1976), p. 15-26, who uses the alternative order 
of procedure. 
10. Adams herself points to these difficulties when she suggests Ockham's terms are 
more akin to Russell's logically proper names than to the ordinary proper names of 
conventional language (1:136-37). 
11. For instance Calvin G. Normore contends in a forthcoming article "Ockham on 
Mental Language," that contrary to Adams' assumption, connotative terms exist only as 
composite, not simple, terms in mental. 
